In late September 2025, Lithuania, together with Poland, Estonia and Latvia, launched a €382 million coordinated effort to bolster the resilience of their power transmission infrastructure against aerial threats—especially drones.
The plan is spearheaded by Lithuanian grid operator Litgrid and Poland’s PSE, with Lithuanian Energy Minister Žygimantas Vaičiūnas and Litgrid CEO Rokas Masiulis playing prominent roles in pitch and advocacy.
As part of its initial steps, Litgrid has already begun physical installations: at its Nemėnčinė substation (near Vilnius), concrete blocks—anti-drone structural barriers—have been placed to shield critical equipment.
The Neris substation, located about 20 km from the Belarusian border, has also received anti-drone concrete protection measures.
Lithuania plans to carry out controlled tests—such as placing explosives at military ranges—to validate the strength and resilience of these structures.
Looking ahead, the project envisions the production and assembly of custom bunkers covering vital parts of many substations—transformers, control rooms, and switchgear modules—that are costly or time-consuming to replace.
To manage costs and complexity, protection is being focused on high-risk and high-value substations rather than blanket coverage of all sites.
Alongside physical defences, Litgrid emphasises deployment of layered security, including cybersecurity, electronic countermeasures, and sensors to detect drone threats.
Ukraine’s grid operator is advising Lithuania and Poland in design choices, materials, and deployment strategies—lessons drawn from Ukraine’s experience warding off drone attacks on its grid infrastructure.
On the Polish side, PSE is reportedly considering the establishment of an armed security unit and even helicopter patrols to protect the corridor via the Suwałki Gap, a strategic stretch linking the Baltics with the rest of NATO.
Financing and procurement details are still emerging. The joint proposal submitted to the EU requests co-funding of half the cost of the programme.
Lithuania anticipates contributing around €150 million for its share—nearly double the amount originally proposed in its bid to Brussels.
Timeline projections indicate that installation and deployment will proceed through the remainder of 2025 and into 2026, with priority given to substations deemed most exposed or critical to national and regional interconnectivity.
In procurement terms, contracts are expected to cover supply of reinforced concrete modules, anti-drone net systems, sensor suites, electronic countermeasure equipment, and ongoing maintenance services.
While detailed vendor names haven’t been widely disclosed yet, the scale and technical sophistication of the project suggest that energy infrastructure firms, defence contractors, and security systems suppliers (both domestic and international) will compete for tenders.
The project is meant to serve as a showcase, with hopes by Lithuanian and Polish stakeholders that their protective scheme may be “copy-pasted” by other nations facing similar threats.
